Exhibit A

	C5TJGAR1 Sei	ntence
1 2	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORKx	
3	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,	
4	V.	11 Cr. 989 JSR
5	WALTER GARCIA,	
6	Defendant.	
7		x
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9		May 29, 2012 5:24 p.m.
10		0.21 F.W.
11	Before:	
12	HON. JED S. RAKOFF,	
13		District Judge
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15	APPEARANCES	
16	PREET BHARARA, United States Attorney for the	
17	Southern District of New York DAVID MILLER,	
18	KAN MIN NAWADAY, Assistant United States Attorneys	
19	PRYOR CASHMAN, LLP	
20	Attorneys for defendant Garcia BY: ROBERT WILLIAM RAY, Esq.	
21	MADELON ANNE GUATHIER, Esq. Of counsel	
22	Also Present: NANCY FESTINGER, Official Certified Spanish Interpreter DAVID MINTZ, Official Certified Spanish Interpreter	
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	II	

1 (In open court) (Case called) 2 3 THE COURT: Good afternoon. Please be seated. All right. We're here for sentence. Let me first 4 5 find out from defense counsel whether the defendant has read and discussed with counsel the presentence report? 6 7 MR. RAY: We have, your Honor. Mr. Garcia has received the presentence report. I have reviewed it with him. 8 9 We have filed various objections to that report. 10 THE COURT: Yes. I'll get to that in a minute. 11 want to make sure he and you have reviewed it? 12 MR. RAY: Yes. 13 THE COURT: Are there any objections other than those 14 that you've already put forth in writing? MR. RAY: I do not believe so, no, your Honor. 15 THE COURT: We'll get to those in a minute. Any 16 17 objections from the government? 18 MR. MILLER: None from the government, your Honor. THE COURT: I think the two objections we need to deal 19 20 with in terms of the quideline calculation are: 21 First, with respect to Paragraph 40, the defense 22 objects to the increase of four levels based on Garcia being an 23 organizer or leader of criminal activity that involved five or 24 more participants, and specifically the allegation is that

Garcia and Batista, who if I recall correctly, didn't get this

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four level increase from one of my colleagues.

MR. MILLER: Correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: Recruited Parra-DeJesus, Kenny Vargas and Jose Urena to travel to Philadelphia to Kidnap the victim or his brother. I am inclined to give that increase, but let me hear from defense counsel if there is anything more he wants to say about that?

MR. RAY: Your Honor, we made that a principal objection in the written objections to the presentence report and have also submitted, as I know your Honor has received, a sentencing submission to that effect.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. RAY: I don't need to be repetitive late in the hour this evening, but I do wish to point out that, so that the record is clear, we made a distinction, and this will come up later in the argument, about where we were prepared to go as part of a proposed plea bargain, a proposed stipulation Mr. Garcia was, in fact, the organizer or leader of narcotics trafficking activity, but not with respect to the kidnapping.

It makes a significant difference here because the base offense level and adjustment for ransom with regard to the kidnapping guidelines are so much higher than would otherwise be the case with regard to the narcotics trafficking guidelines.

Having said that, and I realize it is a fine

distinction, let's go to the facts presented at trial. Who brought in all of these other people to the kidnapping conspiracy? Not my client. The witnesses were quite clear as to who was responsible for those other participants in the conspiracy.

Marco Batista brought those individuals in. He brought those individuals in for a purpose, which was to commit the violence aspect of a violent crime, holding weapons, taking the victim, holding the victim with the use of weapons, transporting the victim in a car which was the same vehicle that was used to conceal the weapons in the first place, the Ford Explorer which had the trap, all in Marco Batista's car.

It is Marco Batista together with these other people who are the ones responsible for what actually transpires, i.e., the kidnapping and the act of violence itself. This was not something that my client did. My client was involved, as I think the testimony --

THE COURT: No. The question is not whether he did it; the question is whether he helped to organize the group that did it.

MR. RAY: I think that is fair, but I think in that regard, to answer your Honor's question, he held Marco Batista accountable for losing drugs or letting drugs go that weren't paid for, and I think it is probably fair from the testimony to characterize that as Marco Batista would have to do something

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2 THE COURT: Like murder!

> MR. RAY: Well, it wasn't clear what was to be done about it except that he was the one that he looked to because he was the one who had the drugs and brought all of these other people in that my client didn't know. In that sense Marco Batista was responsible for this deal, but the narcotics came from a supplier, and Marco Batista was a substantial narcotics trafficker in his own right.

> > THE COURT: Let me hear from the government.

Thank you.

MR. MILLER: Thank your Honor.

Your Honor, as we set forth in our submission and as your Honor, of course, heard from the testimony at trial, Mr. Garcia was, like Mr. Batista, an organizer not only with respect to the narcotics activity but the kidnapping activity.

Even if he wasn't the one who specifically went to Kenny Vargas, for example, and said you want to come help me grab this guy in Philadelphia -- and Mr. Vargas did that because he had dealt with Mr. Batista in the past and knew there were benefits to doing that -- that doesn't mean he wasn't a leader of this kidnapping conspiracy.

We know, for example, from the testimony of Felix Tineo, which the government would submit was credible, that Mr. Garcia, in Mr. Tineo's presence, in Mr. DeJesus' presence and

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certainly with Mr. Batista, held Mr. Batista to account for things, said basically this is your fault, made reference to the fact that they would if necessary have to kill either the victim or the individual who stole the drugs, and set in motion the entire kidnapping conspiracy which he actively participated in by going to Philadelphia.

He wasn't some passive passenger during this entire kidnapping conspiracy. It was his drugs, and Mr. Batista was going to get a cut of that. Mr. Batista worked for Mr. Garcia and knew he better do what Mr. Garcia said, and he did it. Mr. Garcia, as you may remember, when they went to rent the U-Haul truck, Mr. Garcia and Mr. Batista basically directed others to go and put some money on the Citibank card, which Mr. Urena did.

Parra-DeJesus rented the U-Haul truck and Mr. Batista and Mr. Garcia sat and ate in a Subway shop while this was happening because they were the ones who set the others in motion to do the kidnapping.

Mr. Batista surely was present in the basement during the evening when Mr. Garcia was not, but that certainly does not make him any less of a leader merely because he wasn't present for the entire evening in the basement. So I know your Honor's very well aware of the facts.

THE COURT: This is not a case where I have to have a Fatico hearing because the trial provided me with all of the

Sentence

relevant facts. I understand the defense position, put forth as always with considerable eloquence and skill, but I find the facts that were before me that the evidence was certainly more than a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Garcia played a leadership and organizing role in the kidnapping, so I accept the four-point adjustment.

Now, a different question, one I think is much more difficult, is whether this should be the unusual case where even though the defendant went to trial, that there should be an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility.

What makes that difficult is that in the sealed proceedings that the government, of course, did not have access to that preceded the trial when there was a question raised by the defendant regarding counsel, he effectively admitted his guilt except for the gun counts. Of course, it was the gun counts he was acquitted on.

On the other hand, he chose -- presumably because for appeal purposes -- not to make any public statement when he was interviewed by Probation or otherwise.

So in one sense he's accepted responsibility in a very unusual way in a sealed proceeding, and in another way he has not shown acceptance in any public way. For sure he's not entitled to the third point for acceptance of responsibility because that point relates to whether or not he saved the government from having to go to trial, which he clearly did

not. So we're talking here I think two points at most.

So let me hear from defense counsel and government counsel on this.

MR. RAY: Well, I would say with regard to the third point, I guess I take the point in the sense that there was a trial. On the other hand --

THE COURT: The third point is really designed if you're going to save the government from its resources, its time and all things like that.

MR. RAY: I don't want to belabor it. Our point all along in connection with arguing for this unusual exceptional deduction even in the event of a trial was essentially to put the defendant back in the same position he would have been if he had gotten the plea offer frankly that we submit should have been extended.

THE COURT: But that is not the test.

I doubt you can show me anything that tells me that's the test. Moreover, it is not like the situation which does arise under the guidelines where someone after being convicted at trial admits, publicly admits and accepts his guilt. He has tried to have it both ways, which I fully understand. I am not faulting him for that, but it's not at all what the guidelines contemplate.

MR. RAY: On the trying have it both ways part, even if the sealed portion were unsealed, and although this still

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presents some problems under the quidelines, it is clear that he was accepting responsibility for what at least he believed he did based upon what the offer extended was at the time which included only a narcotics conspiracy count and a firearms count.

I don't think Mr. Garcia has any problem about that, that record being unsealed. The problem is to turn what otherwise was nonpublic into public. The problem he is --

THE COURT: Wait. Take this one step at a time. Do vou want this sealed record unsealed?

MR. RAY: If I may have a moment?

THE COURT: Of course.

(Off-the-record discussion)

MR. RAY: No, your Honor, I think, having consulted with my client, I perhaps spoke too soon. I think he wants to preserve the sealed record, and so we are going to be left with arguing from the public record.

THE COURT: So in the public record I don't see any indication of acceptance of responsibility.

MR. RAY: Well, as you have correctly recognized, the difficulty is he is faced with a sentencing guidelines calculation which is life, a recommendation which the government proposes should be a sentence your Honor imposes, a recommended sentence from the U.S. Probation Office, which is 300 months or 25 years, and in any event, even under my

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calculation and proposal to the court, between 210 and 228 months. It is a significant thing indeed for the defendant to essentially waive whatever rights he might have on appeal by accepting responsibility now.

THE COURT: I am not sure it waives -- it certainly doesn't waive his right of appeal.

MR. RAY: No. The word I used was, "Jeopardize."

THE COURT: It might impact, I grant you that, and so I am perfectly happy with your decision. Your client should know this, if this is any solace to him, there is probably no judge in this Court who is less enamoured of the guidelines than this one, but I still am required by law to calculate them. So, but on that record I don't think you have any ground really for saying acceptance of responsibility once that record is sealed or remains sealed.

MR. RAY: I guess except what is not sealed is his willingness, since he signed the plea agreement, to have entered a plea if the plea had not included the gun charge.

Whatever his statements may have been about, you know, affirmatively acknowledging and accepting his responsibility, there is no question his actions are just as significant, and the guidelines make the point particularly in this context, when a court considers post-trial whether or not acceptance of responsibility in the unusual case should be granted to focus specifically on pretrial positions with regard to that issue,

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not whatever the defendant may have said after a jury's verdict has been rendered against him.

THE COURT: I hear all of that but, on the other hand, in the normal situation if there was an acceptance of responsibility, the court would have a full colloquy. I leave this to the Probation Office when I can, but for whatever reason the defendant doesn't want to talk to the Probation Office, which is totally his right, but he still wants an acceptance of responsibility.

Now I will have a colloquy with him. For example, I'd be asking your client all sorts of things about the events, the underlying events which you tell me, but I infer from what you just said about keeping the record sealed, he is not about to want to answer all of that, and I won't hold that against him in any way, shape or form.

MR. RAY: I want to be clear, your Honor, his decision is that he will not answer those questions. I don't want to belabor the point.

THE COURT: I don't think the mere fact he signed that agreement is an adequate factual basis on all of these facts and circumstances to give him credit for acceptance of responsibility.

MR. RAY: I will add, since it is a significant point, that the posture that Mr. Garcia takes, it should be noted, is contrary to the advice of counsel.

I have labored, but it is ultimately his decision to understand the distinction between just the issue that your Honor faces on the one hand, a close call where a court might otherwise be willing in the exception case of this one, to grant acceptance of responsibility credit, but the defendant can't have it both ways. He will have to acknowledge now he is responsible and the court will give consideration, but if he declines to do so in order to preserve what he believes is a justifiable appeal and to not run that risk, that certainly is his right to do so, but it comes as some consequence.

THE COURT: That is fair enough. I am glad you placed all of that on the record.

So the court concludes that the total offense level is 44, the criminal history category is I, and the guideline range which is not binding on the court but which the court must consider is life in prison.

However, the Probation Office recommends 300 months, and it is certainly notable that though every sentence is different and must be considered on its own terms, that Judge Sullivan, yes, sentenced Marco Batista to 244 months of imprisonment and Judge Scheindlin sentenced Parra-DeJesus to 144 months of imprisonment, both of which were non-guideline sentences. So that has to be taken into account by the court as well.

So on what the sentence should be under Section 3553

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(a), let me hear first from defense counsel, then from government counsel, and then from the defendant if he wishes to be heard.

Your Honor, under 3553 (a), one of the MR. RAY: significant factors to be considered, obviously not the only one, I think it bears emphasis on precisely this determination, is to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, the keyword being "unwarranted," and although I understand your Honor has passed upon supervisory adjustment under the guidelines, I think the role with regard to my client's involvement in the offenses that led to his conviction is still nevertheless germane to this determination from the standpoint of arriving at an appropriate sentence and in consideration of the variance factors.

I say that also mindful how we find ourselves in this place in the first place, which is to say, it wasn't that long ago when the guidelines were enacted and first came into regular use in courthouses throughout this district, but the difference between going to trial and pleading guilty was largely two offense levels, and a conviction typically meant the difference between the bottom and the top of the originally set quideline range to which the defendant would have been entitled as a result of his quilty plea.

A long way away from that, and I am not suggesting it is not appropriate for the Congress and Sentencing Commission

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to stray from that original intent, but just for the sake of disparity, look at where we find ourselves. Mr. Garcia would have been in the range of somewhere in the neighborhood of 195 to 228 months even if he pleaded guilty to the gun charge on the offer that the government originally made. He declined for reasons that I think we now know were good ones. He didn't want to plead something to something he didn't do. He rejected that offer.

Going to trial means he faces a guideline sentence of life and sentencing calculation of 300 months with a principal co-defendant responsible for really the violent aspect of the kidnapping, who got a sentence of 244 months.

THE COURT: So I agree largely with what you're saying there in the sense that here, as in so many places, I find the quidelines very difficult to justify, to understand what began as an attempt to do away with disparities has led to all sorts of disparities, many of them inexplicable.

The one you're focusing on is if you might say the historical disparities, for example, between 1987 and the present, the quideline calculations for someone who commits a fraud of a million dollars and has no prior criminal offense has increased under the guidelines 500 percent.

Has the crime charged changed so dramatically in 20 years that it is five times worse than the Sentencing Commission thought it was in 1987? That is preposterous.

MR. RAY: Although public sentiment apparently has changed.

THE COURT: The public sentiment has a role to play, but the last I heard law, justice and reason were supposed to be what guided all of us. Along the lines of what you're talking about, where does the Sentencing Commission get these numbers two points here, four points here, three points there? They pick them out of thin air. They never offer the slightest rationale, but they always justify them because they're this year's attempt to avoid disparities.

Perhaps one of the worst things about the guidelines is they focus much more narrowly on the relevant factors than does Section 3553 (a), which is the overriding guiding message guiding, as the Supreme Court has so eloquently noted, the guidelines are just one aspect of this.

To make that one aspect which plays a secondary role even in the wording of Section 3553 (a) such a mantra, such a blind prescription that the government feels so compelled to adhere to in all but the most exceptional cases is what is again to substitute non-think for reason. So you don't need to convince me about the guidelines. What you need to convince me is — and I think you may have some difficulty — is that Mr. Garcia is not a very bad man.

The proof of it, in addition to the overall situation

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that he found himself in and that he helped in the court's view organize and direct and lead, is that I read many of his statements as saying he wanted to murder the people who stole his drugs or their family, forget about even the immediate person who was giving him a problem, we're drug dealers, let's go after the family, let's murder them, too. I am overstating it, but that's the thrust that comes out loud and clear, it seems to me, from a lot of the evidence in this case.

It is hard to gel that with the kind of sentence you're proposing.

I will say that was different from cooperating witnesses, the best evidence of where he stood on that, though, I think remains in the tape recordings and transcripts themselves in which the subject comes up by the brother of the victim on one occasion, and the implication being, you know, what if I, you know, what if I don't come up with what you're after, what are you going to do to my brother?

And Mr. Garcia is on the telephone saying or denying that it meant what the person on the other end of the phone was concerned about, which is you're going to kill me. He says no, no, no, no, not that at all. Look, what the truth is between that and whatever those witnesses testified to at trial, I know your Honor has a record, I was there, I heard it, too.

I would suggest, your Honor, be careful about that and Mr. Garcia is on that phone, too, I think insistent that this

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be taken care of, but don't think Mr. Garcia was prepared to go there, I submit to you. It also was true, unquestionably true, Mr. Garcia was not responsible for the people that were brought into this thing including the people with guns. That was Mr. Batista's role. That is what he did.

I understand your Honor's made a finding about leading and supervising this activity and about bringing --

THE COURT: You're saying in a more narrow sense.

MR. RAY: I am saying in a more narrow sense. understand there is an accountability here for the kidnapping and conspiracy charge. I am talking about the aspect of the conspiracy directed simply to the question of the ability, preparation for and willingness to use violence and threats pertaining thereto, and I think if you examine carefully this record, I don't think there is enough of a record here to make a finding, however, you want to characterize it, about my client being a very bad man, meaning somebody prepared to kill in order to get what he wanted here. I don't think that is Mr. Garcia. In any event, if I can make one more large argument about the guidelines and I am done with it.

I am not here to argue for leniency under the kidnapping guidelines for all offenses. I am here representing my client. That is all I should be doing. There is another principle of the quidelines, and that was that the quidelines at least in the main are designed to yield sentences at or near

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the statutory maximum when the defendant's prior criminal history warrants it. The government can make whatever arguments they can to make why my client doesn't have a prior criminal.

He is a 62-year-old man and U.S. Citizen, never been previously convicted of an offense. He has one charge in Queens that I will deal with at the conclusion. There is one aspect your Honor should consider I made in the sentencing submission I made for downward departure so he can get credit for 11 months in state custody he otherwise won't get credit for.

This is one of the strange aspects of joint federal state things. If your Honor doesn't give him credit for that 11 months worth of time, nobody else can. Even if the state judge later on decides you know what, I think he suffered enough, I will order his time run concurrently, a state judge doesn't have the power to do that.

THE COURT: I think we need to take that up, but I agree with you, that is the end of the -- the tail wagging the dog, so to speak.

MR. RAY: Right. I have bigger things to worry about. I have a potential life sentence here, 300 month recommendation. I would suggest my second point, in addition to just the aspect of the kidnapping guidelines which I think are excessive as applied to Mr. Garcia, I think there is a

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particular aspect of it being excessive. He doesn't have a prior criminal record. Somebody without a prior criminal record except for the extraordinarily unusual case should not be facing under the guidelines life imprisonment. That is not generally how it is supposed to work.

I can imagine a particularly --

THE COURT: Actually, you see, the irony is that it happens all the time these days and not just in violent cases and not just -- and many fraud cases involving people with no, unquestionably no prior criminal activity because in the fraud area sentences are driven by the amount of the fraud.

In a case I had that is somewhat well known or infamous in the government's eyes, the Adelson case, the guideline range for Mr. Adelson, a white collar criminal with no prior convictions was life in imprisonment. The statutory maximum was 80, so the government took a more modest view than if he had -- since he was 40 years' old, the government figured, you know, you cap give him 80 years and he still might get out at the age of 120.

And in narcotics cases where it is the weight of the drugs that most drives, you'd be surprised how many people without a prior conviction have a guideline range of life imprisonment. I think you're beating a dead horse. It is not the guidelines that is driving this sentence. I hope I've made that clear. It is the factors under Section 3553 (a).

If, for example, a fair reading of the evidence is that your client did intend not only to Kidnap but to murder if necessary not just the person he was after but even members of his family, assuming hypothetically that were the case, life imprisonment would not be farfetched at all.

I was a little taken aback by the comments of my very excellent and much respected colleague, Judge Scheindlin, who suggested in her sentence that basically when your victim is someone involved in the narcotics trade, it is not the same. The last I checked, a human life is a human life.

MR. RAY: Your Honor may note that if it is not obvious by implication, I will tell you explicitly that was not a place I was prepared to go.

THE COURT: I didn't anyway. Let me me shut up.

MR. RAY: The 3553 (a) factors I suggest, your Honor, should appropriately conclude on the evidence my client was more than willing to threaten in order to accomplish the objective of the kidnapping conspiracy, but I would submit to you that he was not prepared to carry that out. I believe that is supported by the taped transcripts.

There is a distinction between threatening bad things and actually being someone who is prepared to use the means to carry that out. As I suggested to your Honor before, I don't believe that that is my client. I think he was insistent this had to be resolved, and he had to answer to other people to

Honor should credit.

make sure that it was resolved, but I don't think murder was a place he was prepared to go. He was prepared to threaten in order to carry out his objective because I think that is what the trial evidence supports, but I don't think a further finding beyond that is warranted, and I would suggest under 3553 (a) that that is a distinction with a difference that your

I think further that my client is 62 years' old, he suffers from cancer. My understanding, I don't know the specific results, but that at least in part prostate cancer has returned in the sense it has spread. He otherwise is not in great health.

That is a factor, I understand not the only factor to be considered, but in weighing what an appropriate and fashioning an appropriate sentence here, obviously if the sentence your Honor imposes is effectively tantamount of life, my client's view is what is the difference. I don't believe he will survive, as I argued in the sentencing memorandum, a sentence longer than what I had imagined before, which would be the top, in the neighborhood of 240 months.

Again I don't subscribe to views about why this case should be treated differently because of the nature of the victims, but on the other hand, remember the enhancements here come at a base offense level of 32 for any kidnapping offense and plus 6 as a result of the fact a ransom was demanded, which

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in this case was either the drugs or money for the drugs. 1 Those are the relevant factors to be considered. 2

I think also some weight should be given, part of it by virtue of Criminal History I, but there has to be a recognition here this man came from Colombia, has a family, has 7 children, has lived in the United States in an otherwise law-abiding life, is a U.S. Citizen, has paid taxes, had a business, lost a business, you know.

This is one man who is of some talent and of some education who has made a life for himself and his family, as I believe the letters that your Honor has received from family members and friends reflect, and I understand your Honor gets letters similar to that.

THE COURT: Believe me, those were important letters and I was very, very pleased you submitted them and I was moved by a number of them.

MR. RAY: I have nothing more than that.

THE COURT: Let me hear from the government.

MR. MILLER: Thank your Honor.

A few points, your Honor. I would like to address the 3553 (a) factors in a second, your Honor, but if I may just to preserve for the government's argument if there is an appeal on the record, with respect to, and this is a little unorthodox, but this has been raised by the defense regarding plea discussions. It is important to note, as we did in our

charges to the defendant.

submission that even after it became clear, putting aside what happened in the sealed proceedings which we the government do know not about, but putting that aside for a moment, we, in fact, offered just the narcotics conspiracy and the kidnapping

This was a plea agreement that was submitted on February 22nd after the government opened and the defense rejected it. They may have rejected it because they didn't like the guidelines. That is fine. It is important to note for the record on appeal it is not at as if the government never offered to drop the 924 (c).

THE COURT: I appreciate your saying that, but I also think any such appeal about the guideline calculation would be frivolous because the sentence that I intend to impose would be the same whether I gave credit for acceptance of responsibility or didn't give credit for acceptance of responsibility.

The guideline range, if I had given the two points which I think is really the maximum that you could ask for under the acceptance of responsibility, would have been 360 to life. If that had been the guideline range, I assure you it would make no difference in the sentence I intend to impose.

MR. MILLER: Thank your Honor.

With respect to 3553 (a), I will make a couple of points. We obviously discussed this at length in our memorandum. I would like to note a few things that actually

your Honor touched upon just now, and that is the nature and circumstances particularly of this offense. This obviously involved a very significant violent offense. I am somewhat troubled by the suggestion that Mr. Garcia didn't even anticipate that anything would happen past a threat, considering the fact that the victim was kidnapped at gunpoint in Philadelphia and brought to the basement of a building in Queens and held there for ransom, meaning the drugs or the money. And even if one was to put —

THE COURT: Besides, when one goes down the road of kidnapping, by the the very nature of the crime, the risk of serious violence is, of course, present even without guns.

The argument is being responded to is tantamount to saying ah, well, I drove my car at 100 miles an hour into a group of people but I didn't intend to kill anyone. This is I think the classic definition of reckless disregard.

You set out to Kidnap someone, and it is all part of the narcotics world famous for its violence, the likelihood that it is going to be equivalent of an unpleasant business meeting is zero, and the risk of violence is always present.

MR. MILLER: Absolutely. That was going to be one of my points. As your Honor is well aware, even putting aside some of the cooperator testimony here at this trial which the government would submit was credible and the government would submit --

THE COURT: The court found the government's evidence totally credible.

MR. MILLER: Thank your Honor.

The calls indicate, including from Mr. Garcia, that Mr. Garcia, when discussing this matter with Jeffrey, indicated look, you're the one who got us all into this mess, you've got your family into this mess. It was a call in which he said that.

Given the fact that, as your Honor noted, this is a kidnapping involving narcotics, that guns were going to be used — in fact, Mr. Garcia while he was not convicted and acquitted on the 924 (c) count, the government did present testimony he was certainly present at a minimum.

THE COURT: Let me ask you this.

Forgive me for interrupting, but I have another matter after this one and I need to move this along a little bit. The thing that gives me the most pause is the sentence that Judge Sullivan imposed. How do you compare Mr. Garcia with Mr. Batista?

MR. MILLER: That was one of the points I was going to get to.

THE COURT: Get to it now.

MR. MILLER: Unwarranted sentencing disparity? That was a considerable reduction off the guidelines. I don't recall the exact guidelines, offhand but I remember they were

in the 300 some-odd range, if memory serves me correctly?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. MILLER: Judge Sullivan noted it was a significant discount off the guidelines as a non-guidelines sentence. The government believes that, as it presented at trial, that Mr. Garcia was above, if you will, in the organization Mr. Batista. Mr. Batista was Mr. Garcia's essentially right-hand guy, and for the purposes of both the narcotics conspiracy in which he was convicted and the kidnapping conspiracy he was convicted, Mr. Garcia was directing this and had just as much a leader position at a minimum of kidnapping. Certainly with respect to the narcotics conspiracy he was above Mr. Batista. I don't think there is any real dispute as to that, that Mr. Garcia needs to be held accountable appropriately and certainly in a way that avoids unwarranted sentencing disparity.

THE COURT: Let me ask you one other question, which is what about the defense request for a 11-month credit under Section 5G 13 because of his incarceration or custody in Queens?

MR. MILLER: The government agrees with the Probation Office on this, that Mr. Garcia should not be credited for that time because he is in state custody for unrelated conduct.

Obviously, the judge has discretion on this, but we make the point we don't believe he should be credited this time on that amount.

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THE COURT: All right. Is there anything the defendant wishes to say?

MR. RAY: Your Honor, can I just fill in the record?

THE COURT: Yes, of course.

MR. RAY: Judge Sullivan's sentencing range was, I think, included in the justification section of the probation office's addendum, page 22.

THE COURT: I have it here. It was in the upper 300s.

MR. RAY: 376.

THE COURT: 376 to 449.

MR. RAY: To 449.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. RAY: I think that comes probably as a result of 60 month consecutive counts on the weapons charges added to whatever the applicable sentencing calculation was on the kidnapping charge.

Again, I have made the point, I just want it to be clear, we think a sentence in excess of Mr. Batista's sentence for Mr. Garcia is excessive. Specifically, in that regard addressing the factor of unwarranted sentencing disparity, I think your Honor should take account of the theme that we had throughout this case. Narcotics were brought to the table by my client, but what accounted for the kidnapping facts, the things that occurred in Philadelphia and then back to New York, were at Mr. Batista's direction: His vehicle, his trap, his

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Sentence

guns and his people. That's why the sentence for Mr. Batista is warranted and should be longer. Mr. Garcia's sentence above that, we believe, is excessive and not warranted. THE COURT: All right. Did Mr. Garcia want to say anything? MR. RAY: Yes. THE COURT: Let me hear from Mr. Garcia. MR. RAY: I believe he has a written statement if I can hand it up to the Court. THE COURT: He can just read it aloud. It probably makes more sense. THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor --THE COURT: Hold on while it's translated. THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, I wish to apologize to you and to the American people for the bad actions which I have committed. THE COURT: Let me hear the translation. THE DEFENDANT: Before God, you are the person who in his name will deal with me, and that is why I ask God to fill you with blessings, so that your Honor will be as benevolent as possible, bearing in mind that I have a family to take care of. These actions which I have committed cause me very much shame and sadness as this is not the best example that I would like to set for my children. I hope that I can count on you to give

me one more chance to prove to you and to the American society

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and to my family how remorseful I am and to show you all that God has taught me since I've been deprived of my liberty.

Thank you very much.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Well, I think that it's somewhat hard to compare

Mr. Batista and Mr. Garcia. In some ways each could be said to

be worse than the other. It depends what you focus on. But in

the end, I am persuaded that while there must be a

non-guideline sentence here for many of the reasons set forth

by able defense counsel, that somewhat more punishment is

required than was meted out to Mr. Batista because I really

cannot escape the conclusion based on the trial that above all

was Mr. Garcia, and so the sentence of the Court is that the

defendant is sentenced to 280 months in prison to be followed

by five years of supervised release on terms I will get to in a

minute. No fine will be imposed because the Court makes a

finding that the defendant is not in a position to pay any

meaningful fine now or in the foreseeable future. There is,

however, a \$300 mandatory special assessment that must be paid.

I should mention before I go further that I have chosen not to adopt the defense counsel's suggestion for the eleventh month departure. I agree with the probation office that that is not warranted.

The terms of supervised release are that defendant shall not commit any other federal, state or local crime; that

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Sentence

defendant shall not illegally possess a controlled substance; 1 2 that defendant shall not possess any firearm or destructive 3 device; that the defendant shall cooperate in the collection of DNA. However, the fifth mandatory condition, the drug testing 4 5 condition, is suspended due to the imposition of a special condition instead that I will get to in a moment. There will 6 7 also be imposed the standard conditions of supervision 1 through 13. They appear on the face of the judgment and will 8 9 be gone over with the defendant by the probation office when 10 the defendant reports to begin his period of supervised 11 release. 12 Finally, there are special conditions: First, the 13 defendant will participate in an approved program for substance 14 abuse and alcohol abuse on the standard terms and conditions. 15 And, second, that the defendant within 72 hours of his release from custody will report to the nearest probation 16 17 office, and he will be supervised by the district of his residence. 18 Now, before I advise the defendant with respect to his 19 20 right of appeal, is there anything else we need to take up? 21 Anything from the government? 22 MR. MILLER: Just that we are going to move to dismiss 23 open counts. 24 All open counts, if any, are dismissed. THE COURT:

Thank you.

MR. MILLER:

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to be clear.

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MR. RAY: Your Honor, there is a distinction between the departure that we asked for under 5G1.53 that your Honor now has ruled upon. Mr. Garcia also is concerned about credit for federal time served. I had assured him that that will be accounted for by the Bureau of Prisons, but I wanted the record

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. RAY: In other words, he was in federal custody beginning in November of --

THE COURT: Yes, whenever he went into federal custody, he gets full credit as you rightly told him.

MR. RAY: Finally, I would ask, for Mr. Garcia's benefit and for the benefit of his family, in view of the fact that there are young children and travel issues involved, if your Honor would recommend to the Bureau of Prisons -- I understand it's not binding -- a facility close to the New York City area.

THE COURT: Yes, I will recommend that. I cannot order that, but I will recommend it.

MR. RAY: That's it. Thank you.

THE COURT: Mr. Garcia, you have a right to appeal the sentence. Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: OK, sir.

THE COURT: And if you can't afford counsel for the appeal, the Court will appoint one for you free of charge.

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      you understand that?
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                THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
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                THE COURT: Very good.
                Thanks very much.
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                (Adjourned)
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